Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

L
arge differences in state cigarette excise tax rates can lead to smuggling of cigarettes from low to high tax states. Smuggling originates both with consumers who cross state lines to purchase cigarettes in low tax states ("casual smuggling") and with firms who evade state taxes ("commercial smuggling" or "bootlegging") . While the economics literature on cigarette smuggling has tended to focus on the first type, 1 anecdotal evidence suggests that commercial smuggling is important (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 1977 (ACIR), , 1985 Lindquist Avey, 1995) . In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of commercial smuggling that allows us to estimate the extent of commercial smuggling and to examine the effects of federal efforts to halt commercial smuggling.
Smuggling was a serious concern for state governments in the mid 1970s, and it has received attention recently because of substantial increases in cigarette taxes. In 1997, ten states increased cigarette tax rates. Whether they were intended for health reasons or to raise revenues, their success depends on the extent to which firms and consumers smuggle in response to increased tax differentials. It is not surprising, then, to find concern over increased smuggling.
2 Our estimates corroborate that concern. In our sample, we find that commercial smuggling accounted for three to four percent of all cigarettes sold during the 1970s, a decade of high real excise tax rates (and differentials) .
While the model allows us to measure the extent of commercial smuggling and, hence, to examine both the importance of commercial smuggling and the effect of tax changes, our primary policy focus is on the Contraband Cigarette Act (CCA). This legislation followed appeals by a number of states for federal assistance and a recommendation by the ACIR that federal legislation was needed to prohibit interstate transportation of contraband cigarettes. Passed in late 1978, the CCA prohibits single shipments, sale, or purchase of more than 60,000 cigarettes not bearing the tax indicia of the state in which they are found. The CCA is commonly believed to have solved the smuggling problem.
The Commission concludes that the incidence of cigarette smuggling has declined significantly since 1977, due in large part to the passage of the Federal Contraband Cigarette Act in 1978 (ACIR, 1985, p. 4) .
Contrary to the ACIR conclusion, we find federal entry into cigarette enforcement had the opposite of the intended effect. According to our estimates, commercial smuggling increased in 1979 and fell in the early 1980s, but it would have decreased in all years and the decrease would have been greater if the Act had not been passed. While this result may seem surprising, we show it can be explained by a combination of factors related to a change in the balance of enforcement activities following passage of the law.
This change appears to have caused changes in smuggling methods employed by firms.
In the next section, we discuss methods of smuggling and enforcement. In the third section, we present an estimating equation based on a stylized model in which a portion of firms selling cigarettes in a state smuggle to evade high state excise taxes. In our model, the portion of taxpaid sales in a state is a function of taxes, the cost associated with acquiring and camouflaging smuggled cigarettes, as well as enforcement. The estimation procedure involves estimating consumer demand that allows us to account for the types of smuggling done by consumers as well as commercial smuggling.
The model is estimated using annual data from 1972-90: a sample that includes periods of high and low state tax differentials. The fourth and fifth sections report those results, as well as revenue losses associated with commercial smuggling. In the 40 states in our sample, we find the estimated losses range between a low of $34 million in 1985 and a high of $427 million in 1972. In the fourth section, we show that our results accord well with other evidence on the level of commercial smuggling, and in the following section, we present evidence that the federal tax rate affects interstate smuggling. Finally, in the sixth section, we present alternative models that support our central result that passage of the CCA was associated with an increase in the level of commercial smuggling.
TYPES OF SMUGGLING AND ENFORCEMENT
Three types of cigarette smuggling are relevant to our analysis. The first, casual smuggling, is done by consumers in high tax states who cross state lines to purchase cigarettes in low tax states. The second is the sale of tax-free cigarettes on American Indian reservations and military installations to non-Indians and nonmilitary personnel. This smuggling, like the first, is thought to be primarily smuggling by consumers. We focus on the third, commercial smuggling, but, as noted in the third section, our empirical estimates control for the first two.
Commercial smuggling occurs in a variety of ways, but the main ones are smuggling "over-the-road" and "diversion."
3 In smuggling over-the-road, legal cigarettes are purchased directly from the manufacturer, while cigarettes to be smuggled are purchased from distributors in low tax states who are paid not to attach a tax stamp (even though the tax is paid in the low tax state). These cigarettes are then transported to high tax states, where counterfeit stamps are used (except in a few states that do not use tax stamps) to allow their sale along with those on which all taxes are paid. The primary sources for such cigarettes are the tobacco producing (and lowest tax) states, NC, KY, and VA. Table 1 presents the per capita tax paid cigarette sales is these three states as well as the U.S. average for selected years. Smuggling is not thought to have been a problem in 1961 when few states had differences in taxes (excluding local taxes) larger than $0.25 (in 1990 prices). Per capita sales in KY and VA 4 for 1961 are less than the U.S. average. By 1972, most states had tax differences in excess of $0.30, and per capita tax paid cigarette sales in the three out-smuggling states had risen well above the U.S. average.
The second method involves diversion schemes and manipulation of cigarette accountability records. While such schemes were not considered a major problem prior to 1978, a 1984 ACIR survey lists diversion of cigarettes from legal channels as a major source of smuggled cigarettes in seven states. With this type of smuggling, firms purchase only from manufacturers, but they do not report a portion of their sales, thus diverting cigarettes from legal to illegal channels. Diversion is similar to over-the-road smuggling in that tax-paid sales serve to camouflage illegal sales and cigarettes carry counterfeit tax stamps. However, no state taxes are paid on the cigarettes smuggled via diversion. Diversion also leaves a paper trail since manufacturers make their sales records available to any state requesting them. Matching these records with those on tax-paid sales can uncover diversion. In contrast, smuggling overthe-road does not produce records subject to audit, and its detection involves surveillance and undercover police work. This distinction will prove useful for interpreting our results with regard to the CCA, but first it is necessary to understand enforcement efforts during the period we examine.
The importance of the CCA was that it made commercial cigarette smuggling a federal offense and a federal agency (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)) was charged with augmenting 3 See Lindquist Avey (1995) and ACIR (1977 ACIR ( , 1985 for information on these two schemes, as well as hijacking and mail order sales. 4 NC data are unavailable as only tax-paid sales data are gathered and NC did not tax cigarettes in 1961. 1961 1972 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1984 1987 1990 121  179  223  225  215  215  210  183  171  183   NA  214  226  206  197  188  179  161  151  134   120  137  153  156  152  149  150  137  133  119 the enforcement efforts of state and local officials. There are two important points with regard to BATF entry and enforcement. First, entry of the federal government did not necessarily increase expenditure on enforcement, and second, the mix of enforcement activities (i.e., surveillance versus tax audits) appears to have changed with federal entry. Regarding the first issue, the ACIR (1985) cited post-CCA reductions in expenditure at both the state and federal levels: "some states [used] federal actions to justify reducing their role in enforcing cigarette tax laws." The ACIR concluded that "the majority of states reduced the amount of resources allocated to enforcing cigarette tax laws" either because of the federal presence taking the pressure off the states or because of a perception that smuggling was lower (hence reducing the perceived returns to state enforcement). Additionally, in 1980, the federal government began attempts to reduce or eliminate funds appropriated for enforcement of the CCA (ACIR, 1985) . We were told by state tax administrators that by the late 1980s the BATF no longer allocated efforts toward enforcement since smuggling was believed to have disappeared and that enforcement efforts would be reinstated if the states felt smuggling was again a problem.
With regard to types of enforcement, it is important to note that ACIR testimony supports the view that effective enforcement necessitates actions by both law enforcement agencies and tax administrators. Surveillance by law enforcement agencies is needed for detection of overthe-road smuggling, while auditing is needed to detect diversion. The BATF is well positioned for interstate surveillance, but it is not an audit agency, nor does the law permit it to examine records of suspected smugglers except by court order. Tax auditing remains the primary responsibility of the states. According to the ACIR (1985) , BATF focused on overthe-road smuggling, not only because of limited audit rights, but also because in 1978 diversion was considered unimportant. Indeed, the 1977 ACIR report ignored the issue, and the 1985 report indicated surprise at the extent of diversion. Since the states are the primary auditing agents, the reduction in their enforcement efforts reduced overall enforcement by auditing. With the BATF focus on over-the-road smuggling and reduced auditing by the states, one would expect diversion to increase and over-the-road smuggling to fall with ambiguous effects on the overall level of smuggling.
In light of ACIR questions as to whether enforcement expenditures increased, as well as the change in nature of enforcement during the period, it is natural to ask whether the CCA had its intended effect of reducing commercial cigarette smuggling. In the next section, we develop a method that allows us to address this issue.
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF COMMERCIAL SMUGGLING
In this section, we develop an estimable function for tax-paid sales in a state as a fraction of total sales. This equation is consistent with the theoretical model of commercial smuggling given in Appendix A, but it also allows for the fact that market data reflect smuggling by consumers as well as commercial smuggling. We also explain the variables used to reflect taxes and enforcement parameters. Below and in Appendix B are discussions of data and the estimation procedure.
Estimating Equation
We start with a standard cigarette demand function that treats cigarettes in neighboring states as a substitute for "local" cigarettes and which accounts for the presence of non-tax-paid sales on military bases and Indian reservations. The model of cigarette consumption we adopt assumes myopic individual behavior. Becker and Murphy (1988) introduce a model of rational addictive behavior that they argue is appropriate for smoking. An empirical model that adopts their approach would potentially include past and future prices and consumption. Our myopic model includes only past consumption. Empirical support for the Becker/ Murphy model is reported in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) and Chaloupka (1991) . The latter paper uses individual data and finds strong evidence for a 100 percent depreciation rate on the addictive stock over time. This implies that past and future prices can be omitted. The difference between our model and the rational addiction model, therefore, is in the omission of the future value of consumption. We do not include it because we are not entirely convinced of the appropriateness of the rational addiction model applied to annual aggregate data. In addition, there are extreme econometric difficulties in estimating our model with future consumption on the righthand side of equation 1. This difficulty will become apparent as we develop the empirical model.
Since available data on cigarette sales are on tax-paid or legal sales, we observe only a portion of the sth state's cigarette demand when there is commercial smuggling. Define γ st , 0 < γ st ≤ 1, to be the fraction of demand in the sth state in year t that is not smuggled into the state by commercial smugglers. In equilibrium, γ st equals tax-paid sales as a fraction of total sales in the state. That is, we observe 
where γ st is unobserved, but it is estimable.
Note that γ st is the sum of tax-paid sales by firms who smuggle (either over-theroad or by diversion) and sales by firms who do not engage in smuggling divided by total demand. Thus, parameters that affect the expected profits of smugglers and total legal outlets differently may have ambiguous effects on γ st . This is noted in our discussion of expected signs for coefficient estimates, and for the interested reader, an explicit treatment of comparative static effects of enforcement, taxes, and manufacturer's cost is given in Appendix A, where we derive the theoretical analogue of γ st . Not surprisingly, the analogue of γ st is a function of the tax differential with the low-tax states, enforcement parameters, as well as other cost and market conditions. The fraction of sales on which smugglers pay the state tax is also affected by aggregate sales in the state through the inverse demand equation, RP st (Q st ) (equations A4 and A6). The function we estimate is
where TAXDIF = the difference in the tax rate in state s and the tax in NC, ENFORCE = the level of enforcement, and w st = a random error assumed to be distributed
TAXDIF st is our measure of the incentive for firms to smuggle. As noted above, when firms smuggle over-the-road, they pay the state excise tax in NC, KY, or VA. The nominal taxes in these three states were unchanged during the period of our observations at 2, 3, and 2.5 cents, respectively. Since NC is thought to be the primary source of cigarettes smuggled overthe-road, we measure the incentive for firms to smuggle by the difference in the local state excise taxes and the excise tax in NC. 8 The appropriate measure of the incentive to smuggle by diversion is the tax rate in state s. However, TAXDIF and the tax rate in state s are highly correlated so that both measures yield almost identical results; hence, we report results only for TAXDIF.
Enforcement level is unobserved, but it is a function of observable variables. We consider this below, although we note for now the reasonable assumption that EN-FORCE is equal to 0 if TAXDIF = 0. A quadratic in TAXDIF is used to account for possible nonlinearity. In order for γ st to equal 1 when the tax differential is 0 (as it should), we choose an exponential form and interact the random error and RP with TAXDIF. Our theoretical analysis implies a positive sign for RP's coefficient, but TAXDIF can have an ambiguous sign. There is a direct effect of TAXDIF on each smuggler's choice of tax-paid sales, which is negative, but an increase in TAXDIF also changes total sales of smugglers and nonsmugglers. These latter effects can outweigh the direct effect, in which case the net effect would be positive. Nonetheless, we expect increases in TAXDIF to reduce δ st (δ 1 < 0).
All else being equal, γ st should increase as the level of enforcement rises, so that δ 3 > 0. However, enforcement is itself a function of the tax differential: an increase in the differential increases the incentive for states to engage in enforcement activities since the returns to enforcement activity are potentially greater. There is little direct evidence on the level of antismuggling enforcement. Other than the tax differential, our evidence includes the date of passage of the CCA, the fact that some states were members of joint enforcement operations, some qualitative information on the severity of penalties for smuggling, and the rebate offered to wholesalers for each legal sale. Benjamin (1992) argues that payment of a discount or rebate to wholesalers for each legal sale is a form of enforcement. Ostensibly, the discount is to cover the cost of affixing tax indicia, but it is widely agreed that the rate is in excess of the cost of stamping the cigarettes and is therefore a disincentive for smuggling.
There are two final issues regarding estimation of equation 3. First, RP itself can be affected by the fraction of tax-paid sales, in which case RP and the random error in the γ st function are dependent. We 8 Results do not change if the KY or VA tax rates are used. 9 Part of the reason it is hard to measure accurately enforcement activities by state is that enforcement is undertaken by both state law enforcement and tax agencies. The relative importance of these agencies in enforcement activities varies from state to state (ACIR, 1977) . See also Maltz, Edelhurtz, and Chamberlain (1976). account for this simultaneity by using an instrumental variables estimation procedure. Second, distance between NC, KY, VA, and state s could potentially affect γ st . However, transport costs account for only 0.5 percent of the value of tobacco products; hence, their effect on smuggling should be negligible (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 1991 (1985) and given in private discussion to the authors suggests that enforcement activity varied substantially during the 1980s.
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In equation 4 interaction with TAXDIF is used so that the level of enforcement is 0 if there is no incentive for firms to smuggle (TAXDIF = 0). It is expected that membership in IRRC or ESICTEG will increase the level of enforcement (α 3 > 0) and that more severe penalties for smuggling will also have a positive effect on enforcement (α 4 > 0).
The above implies
where
An estimate of φ from equation 6, used in equations 5 and 2, provides estimates of the extent of commercial smuggling in each state.
Several points remain. First, the coefficients of equation 4, the enforcement equation, are not identified since they are multiplied by δ 3 , the coefficient of enforcement in the equation for γ st , which is presumed positive. Second, the coefficient of TAXDIF st is the sum of a (presumed) negative, unidentified coefficient (δ 1 ), and the product of two positive, unidentified coefficients (δ 3 and α 1 ); hence, TAXDIF st 's coefficient cannot be signed a priori. Likewise, the coefficient of TAXDIF 2 st is a combination of unidentified coefficients and cannot be signed. Finally, the variances σ 2 w and σ 2 n are not identified.
Data and Method of Estimation
We estimate equation 6 using annual data from 1972-90 for 39 states plus the District of Columbia. Our data exclude observations on states with local government taxes (AL, IL, MO, NJ, NY, and TN), since the information needed to calculate an effective tax rate is unavailable (see also Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 1991) . HI and AK are excluded since smuggling of cigarettes for these states may be of a distinctly different character given the necessity of ocean travel or travel through Canada when hauling contraband cigarettes. Observations on NC, KY, and VA are excluded since they are sources of commercially smuggled cigarettes. We do not extend our data into the 1990s because of the large presence, in those years, of smuggling from Mexico into the United States (Lindquist Avey, 1995) . By ending our sample period in 1990, we avoid the necessity of specifying a function to account for smuggling out of Mexico. The data are a total of 760 observations (T = 19 and N = 40). In Table  2 are the mean values of per capita tax paid cigarette sales, price, and state tax levels (in 1990 prices) for the 40 states in our sample for each of the 19 years as well as the tax difference with NC.
The disturbances in equation 6 are the sum of a heteroscedastic disturbance, ε st , and a heteroscedastic MA (1) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 128. 
THE EXTENT OF SMUGGLING AND ENFORCEMENT Parameter Estimates
Results for model 6 are in Table 3 , where variables are named in an obvious shorthand. For the demand variables, CAN is insignificant and INDIAN has a sign counter to our intuition; all others are significant and have expected signs. We test the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the variables in γ st are jointly zero; that is, we test whether γ st = 1 ∀ s and t. This is a test of whether commercial smuggling takes place; if γ st = 1, then tax-paid sales are equal to demand and no commercial smuggling takes place. The p value is very close to 0; hence, we reject the hypothesis that all are jointly equal to zero. The coefficients of TAXDIF and TAXSQ are jointly significantly different from 0. Recall that their coefficients are combinations of unidentified parameters and their signs are indeterminant. MEMB, FELONY, DISC, and RP are significant. The coefficient on membership in antismuggling organizations has, as expected, a positive effect on the proportion of legal sales, but the FELONY and DISC coefficients have signs counter to expectations.
Recall the ACIR quote attributing reductions in smuggling in the early 1980s to passage of the CCA. Our estimates imply the contrary: holding other factors constant, passage of the Act is associated with a fall in the proportion of legal sales. Smuggling activity did appear to fall during the early 1980s (see below), but not in response to passage of the Act. Each year the Act is in effect has a negative effect on γ st except for 1985 (for which the effect is insignificant). For all other years, except 1986-7, the estimated coefficients are significant at the ten percent level. A joint test of whether all the coefficients of these variables are 0 has a p value close to zero.
By our estimates, the CCA did not have the intended effect of reducing commercial smuggling. The ACIR reports discussed earlier lend support to the view that this may have been due to a combination of factors endogenous to federal entry into enforcement. In particular, (1) some states reduced enforcement in response to federal entry, (2) the BATF itself reduced expenditure once it believed smuggling had declined, and (3) the mix of enforcement activity changed with federal entry. With regard to (3), less effort was directed toward enforcement via auditing of tax records and more effort toward other forms of enforcement such as surveillance and undercover work. As noted, diversion is subject to detection by auditing and over-the-road smuggling is subject to detection by surveillance and undercover work. Since BATF efforts are on over-the-road and the states are the primary auditing agents, the reduction in the latter's enforcement efforts reduced overall enforcement by auditing. With the BATF focus on over-the-road smuggling and reduced auditing by the states, one would expect diversion to increase and over-the-road smuggling to fall. An increase in smuggling simply requires that the former reduction be less than the latter increase.
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The question arises as to why, with the increase in diversion, the states did not return to auditing? We were told by several state tax administrators that cigarette smuggling is not detectable unless an agency is actively looking for smugglers, or else substantial amounts of smuggling are taking place. Beginning before passage of the CCA, smuggling activity had been declining and continued to decline after a jump in 1979 (we turn to this below), leaving the impression that the BATF was effective. With the impression that smuggling was disappearing, the states did not search for smugglers, and hence were not in a position to determine the adverse effects of the Act.
Level of Smuggling
From estimates of the γ st function parameters, we can estimate the level of commercial smuggling. Estimates are presented in Table 4 under two scenarios. In the first, we estimate commercial smuggling implied by the model (the "With CCA" columns of Table 4 ). We then estimate smuggling assuming that the CCA was never passed; that is, we set CCA t = 0 ∀ t. The columns "%Smug" give the average values of the percent of total sales (100 × (1 -γ st )) commercially smuggled into the 40 states in our sample. The estimated standard errors are in columns "SE." Also presented are the average per capita packs of cigarettes smuggled into 11 An Appendix available from the authors gives comparative statics of a model in which firms smuggle by diversion, as well as over-the-road, and enforcement takes two forms, auditing and surveillance. In this model, both types of smuggling respond to enforcement; and if both types of enforcement increase, overall smuggling activity decreases. If, however, one type of enforcement increases and the other decreases, firms will switch their method of smuggling toward the latter. The effect on tax-paid sales depends on the actual changes in enforcement and the elasticities of firms' responses. For sufficiently large decreases in auditing and increases in diversion, the level of tax-paid sales will decrease. Thus, our empirical results are consistent with the expected response by smugglers to changes in enforcement after passage of the CCA. 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 4 National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 1 (March 2000) pp. 59-78 the 40 states (columns "Smug"). For some states and time periods, the value of γ st is greater than 1 implying no smuggling. The columns "%Smug" are based on the estimated value of γ st regardless of whether it is above or below 1; this allows for a correct estimated variance. However, the columns "Smug" are calculated by setting to 1 any value of γ st in excess of 1 (about 20 percent of the γ st 's are greater than 1).
Smuggling activity generally declined from 1972 until 1979, when it took a jump before continuing its downward trend before turning up in the late 1980s. In the absence of the CCA, there would not have been a jump in 1979. The empirical model therefore implies that smuggling was higher in 1979 by about two packs of cigarettes per capita due to changes following passage of the Act. Estimates of the percent smuggled are not significantly different from 0 in 1985-6. We estimated the revenue lost from increased smuggling following passage of the CCA wherein we set to 1 any value of γ st in excess of 1. The implied aggregate revenue loss (in 1990 dollars) for 1979-90 due to passage of the Act is $1,103 million.
A final question of interest is: Are the smuggling numbers reported in Table 4 reasonable? The 1977 and 1985 ACIR reports include several estimates of the level and changes in smuggling. Even though the ACIR reports are based on all forms of smuggling for all 50 states, and our estimates are only for commercial smuggling in 40 states, our numbers are roughly similar. The 1985 ACIR report claims that cigarette tax evasion declined 45 percent between 1975 and 1985, while we estimate the decline (using column "Smug") at 49 percent. On the revenue side, the 1977 ACIR report claims a loss in 1976 of $900 million (in 1990 dollars) in state and local tax revenues from all forms of cigarette smuggling. Our estimate of the state tax loss from commercial smuggling for the states in our sample is $278 million. the years 1972-9, the values in column 2 are either within our confidence intervals or are above the upper bound (this occurs in one case). After 1979, all values in column 2 are below the lower bound except for 1987. Since the numbers in column 2 reflect only over-the-road and casual smuggling, this lends credibility to our argument that a change in form of law enforcement lowered over-the-road smuggling and increased diversion smuggling.
FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES AND SMUGGLING
It has been proposed by the Clinton administration (and others) that the federal excise tax on cigarettes be raised from the current 24 cents per pack.
12 What effect might such increases have on commercial smuggling? At first, it may seem odd that there is a relationship between γ st and the federal tax, since an increase in the federal tax increases marginal costs for smugglers and nonsmugglers. However, smugglers' marginal costs increase less than do nonsmugglers, since smugglers can decrease the portion of their sales on which they pay the tax. The effect of an increase in the federal tax is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the output response of the two different types of firms.
13 That is, the effect on γ st is indirect through equilibrium output responses (see Appendix A and Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 1991) .
In our empirical model, the federal tax is therefore embedded (enters) in the retail price term RP st (Q st ), which appears both in the demand equation 1 and the legal sales equation 3. An increase in the excise tax, all else equal, will increase price; hence, an analysis of changes in smuggling pre-and post-1983, the only year in our sample in which the federal excise tax was changed, might shed light on the effects of federal taxes on organized smuggling. Unfortunately, we are unable to separate changes in retail price due to, say, shifts in labor costs, from changes due to excise tax changes. As a remedy, we estimate equation 6 after introducing the federal excise tax directly into equation 3. This allows us to measure the effect on the level of legal sales of a change in excise tax, holding constant retail price. The fact that we now introduce the excise tax as well as retail price does not imply misspecification in the models estimated earlier: the excise taxes are included in our earlier models, albeit indirectly. Note that we cannot simply enter the excise tax as one regressor and the difference between the retail price and the excise tax since, in general, only a portion of the tax will appear in the price term.
Estimation with the federal tax in the γ st function produces a negative and significant coefficient on the federal tax. This implies decreases in the proportion of legal sales with increases in the federal tax. While federal tax collections might well rise, state collections will fall. The implied elasticity of γ st with respect to the federal excise tax is -0.076. We continue to find that passage of the CCA is associated with an increase in smuggling.
SENSITIVITY OF REGRESSION RESULTS
In this section, we alter our regression model in several ways in order to provide evidence on the sensitivity of our results 12 See, for example, The Wall Street Journal, January 5, 1998 ("Clinton to Propose Cigarette Tax Increase"). 13 Referring to the Appendix,
. Since the sign of ∂q i * /∂T f is ambiguous, any empirical result is consistent with the theory. However, if demand is linear or not too convex, ∂q i * /∂T f < 0 for i = 1, 2. This is the intuitively expected result since an increase in the federal tax increases per unit cost of both smuggled and legal units sold. In this case, γ st will decrease for N i fixed, if the response of a legal trader is greater than that of a smuggler. Although it is not included in our theoretical model, an increase in the federal tax may induce firms to exit, in which case γ st is more likely to decrease if N 2 decreases more than N 1 . to the particular model chosen. In the interest of brevity, we summarize results. Wasserman et al. (1991) report evidence suggesting nonconstant price and income elasticities of demand for cigarettes. Their regressions use income and price as well as those variables interacted with a time trend. However, Laughunn and Lyon (1971) report no such interaction effects. We introduced into our model the interaction of the time trend with the logs of price and income.
14 While our estimates of the changes in elasticities over time do not completely agree with the results of Wasserman et al., the evidence on smuggling and its revenue effects is very similar to that observed with the above results. In particular, there is a jump in smuggling associated with passage of the CCA.
The empirical model we develop allows for a different CCA effect in each of the years 1979-90. This specification follows from suggestions in the ACIR (1985) report and from conversations with tax administrators, which imply that enforcement effects by the BATF varied over these years. This requires a large number of regressors and causes a loss of efficiency if enforcement varied little over this period. We replaced the 1979-90 dummies (interacted with the tax difference) with a single dummy variable, indicating a year in which the CCA was in effect interacted with both TAXDIF and the square of TAXDIF. Again, we find an increase in smuggling associated with passage of the CCA.
The estimated level of smuggling for 1990 is large and out of line with the other values, which suggests that 1990 is an outlier. We dropped the observations for 1990 and re-estimated. Dropping 1990 does not change our basic result regarding the effects on smuggling from passage of the CCA.
Our sample includes only those states that do not have local cigarette taxes. Calculation of an effective tax rate that is not simultaneous with the dependent variable is not possible. Nonetheless, we did estimate our model including those states. The results on the effect of the CCA continue to hold.
Several of the variables in our empirical model have signs counter to our intuition. This may be the result of the particular measures we are forced to use because of data availability. There may be substantial measurement error. We experimented with selectively deleting these variables. In addition, the inclusion of the square of TAXDIF is simply for detecting possible nonlinearity in the effects of TAXDIF. We also dropped this variable from the model. In each case, we continue to observe an increase in smuggling following passage of the CCA.
Our empirical model, through necessity, is a specific functional form. Nonetheless, variations in the model, as well as in the sample, repeat the central result that passage of the CCA is associated with an increase in commercial smuggling.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we develop a theoretical and empirical model that permits estimation of the level of organized smuggling of cigarettes. The levels of smuggling, as well as the generally decreasing trend in that level, accord well with evidence presented in the 1977 and 1985 ACIR reports. We find two important policy results. First, passage of the federal CCA did not deter smuggling, as has been claimed. Those who claim success for the Act interpret the general decline in cigarette smuggling from the 1970s to the 1980s as evidence of its success. We find evidence that the decline was not due to passage of the Act. Rather, it followed from generally decreasing real levels of state tax differentials. In every model we estimate, we find an increase in smuggling 14 Neither Laughunn and Lyon (1971) or Wasserman et al. (1991) deal with smuggling issues.
following passage of the Act; this increase is then followed by a continuation of the downward trend in cigarette smuggling.
Second, we find that increases in the federal excise tax are associated with a greater proportion of smuggled cigarettes. Proposed increases in the excise tax may well operate to raise federal tax revenues and lower the level of cigarette smoking, but the tax will also serve to increase the proportion of smuggled cigarettes and thereby reduce state revenues. This result has not been anticipated by government officials or previous studies of smuggling. Officials are clearly aware that changes in the federal tax could affect consumers smuggling across the Canadian and Mexican borders, but our results come from examining commercial smuggling. Since previous studies have tended to focus on smuggling by consumers, the effects we find have been unnoticed.
fines and/or imprisonment in addition to confiscation. Data from the ACIR (1985) suggest that state penalties are relatively low. Fines appear more prevalent than prison sentences, and state fines are lower than those for a federal conviction. Our results for 1979-84 show that the value of confiscation was less than onetenth of one percent of estimated values for the amount smuggled. Second, while they discuss the relevance of their model to interstate cigarette smuggling, they do not derive an empirically estimable smuggling function.
Consider the decision problem of the ith cigarette distributor in state s, where the state government levies an excise tax of T s per unit sold. If the firm pays the tax on all units sold, its profits are
where P(Q) is the inverse demand facing firm i, Q is the quantity of cigarettes sold by all firms in s, w is the manufacturer's price, T f is the federal tax, c i is the cost associated with transportation and /or retailing, and q i is the quantity sold by firm i.
Alternatively, the firm may try to avoid paying the tax on (1 -γ i )q i of its sales, where γ i < 1 is the portion of sales on which it pays the state tax. In this case, the firm purchases γ i q i cigarettes from the manufacturer and (1 -γ i )q i cigarettes from a distributor in a low tax state, j, paying T j per unit plus a premium to the distributor not to affix any tax stamp to the cigarettes (ACIR, 1985) . The smuggling firm then uses a counterfeit tax stamp in s. Enforcement efforts make this a risky activity. We incorporate this aspect of smuggling by introducing a parameter, e, to denote the level of enforcement, and we express p, the probability firm i successfully smuggles a unit, as a decreasing function of e. We also assume p is a function of the portion of sales the firm attempts to smuggle, with p(γ i , e) increasing and concave in γ i . This and the assumption that p(0, e) = 0 for all e imply that a firm must pay taxes on some portion of its sales, a standard feature in models of camouflaging. In addition, p(γ i , e) ∈ [0, 1] for all γ i and p(1, e) = p(γ i , 0) = 1. As noted earlier, firms caught smuggling are subject to fines, imprisonment, and confiscation of cigarettes. For simplicity, assume that confiscated cigarettes are resold by the government. Also, expectations are rational so that (1 -p(•) ) is the true fraction of firm i's sales that are detected and confiscated. Thus, expected profit for a firm that tries to evade taxes in s is given by
represents per unit excess smuggling cost. The first two terms in E i represent costs incurred by the firm regardless of whether it is successful in smuggling. The parameter a i is included to differentiate firms by their ability and cost of smuggling. One could think of a i as representing the premium paid to a wholesaler in a low tax state. If the firm has established ties with the wholesaler, it may pay a lower premium than others. Managers may also differ in their ability and/ or experience in camouflaging. The second component of E i represents fines (or an imputed cost associated with imprisonment) and is incurred only if the firm's smuggling efforts are unsuccessful. The term F is a constant per unit, so that the expected fine is decreasing and convex in γ i . Finally, we assume Eπ i is concave in q i and γ i .
Each firm is assumed to choose q i and g i so as to maximize expected profit in equation 2, taking as given the behavior of rival firms, the manufacturer 's price, taxes, and enforcement parameters. Under these assumptions, the firm will smuggle some, but not all, of its sales in state s (1 > γ i > 0) whenever
This is because ∂Eπ i /∂γ i simplifies to T j + ea i -T s when the firm doesn't smuggle, i.e., when γ i = 1. T j + ea i represents the expected marginal cost from switching a unit of sales from legal to illegal. When this is less than T s , the marginal National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 1 (March 2000) pp. 59-78 benefit from the switch, it is optimal for the firm to attempt to smuggle some of its sales. If, however, the firm tries to avoid all taxes (γ i = 0), [P(Q) + F][1 + ∂p(0, e)/∂γ i ] + T j + ea i represents the firm's excess cost and expected loss from fines and confiscation. If this exceeds T s , the firm will pay taxes in state s on some portion of its sales. Note that the firm will not smuggle if the right-hand inequality in equation A3 does not hold.
To obtain a market equilibrium in which some, but not all, firms smuggle, we assume two types of firms, differentiated only by the excess smuggling cost parameter, a i . Type 1 firms have a 1 , which is low enough that equation A3 holds, and type 2 firms have a 2 , which is high enough that equation A3 does not hold (so that γ 2 = 1). Under our assumptions, there will be a unique Nash equilibrium in which type 1 firms pay T s on γ 1 * of their sales and type 2 firms pay all taxes. Since firms are identical except for a i , the equilibrium level of sales in state s can be written as Q * = N 1 q 1 * + N 2 q 2 * , where N 1 and N 2 are the number or type 1 and 2 firms, respectively, and γ 1 * , q 1 * , and q 2 * (hence Q * ) are implicitly defined by
In this model, γ 1 * can be written as γ 1 * = f(Q * ; e, T s , T j , F, a 1 ). We can express γ 1 in this way because ∂f i / ∂q i = ∂f i / ∂q j < 0, for all i, j, as well as the fact that type 2 firms are identical. See TJT for a more detailed treatment of equilibrium properties of this type of model. The following comparative static properties hold. A change in T s affects γ 1 * directly, but it also affects γ 1 * through its effects on q 1 * and q 2 * . The direct effect is negative, but the sales effects are ambiguous, so that we cannot sign the effect of a change in T s on the equilibrium fraction of state taxpaid sales. An increase in any excess smuggling cost parameter (T j , e, a 1 , or F) increases γ 1 * and q 2 * , but decreases q 1 * . Increases in the federal tax, manufacturer's price, and transport cost act somewhat differently because they affect the per unit cost of legal and illegal sales, while the tax in state j and the enforcement parameters only affect the cost of smuggled cigarettes. In general, we cannot sign the effect of an increase in the federal tax or manufacturer's price, but in the special case of linear demand, both have the intuitively expected effect of reducing total sales of nonsmugglers and smugglers.
It is worth noting that the parameters underlying γ 1 * = f(•) are fairly robust to a variety of changes in the model. The same parameters would appear in the function for tax-paid sales if we had modeled firms' choices as the levels of illegal and legal sales or if we had specified p(•) as a function of the quantity of cigarettes smuggled (rather than γ). Changes in the model that would affect the form of γ 1 * = f(•) are the assumption that cigarettes are confiscated and resold and the assumption that cigarettes are smuggled over-the-road. If confiscated cigarettes were resold, γ 1 * would be a function of the distribution of illegal and legal sales (rather than simply Q * ). If diversion was the method of smuggling, T j would not appear as an argument. The fixed-effects (within) estimator is inconsistent for fixed T (number of time periods) because of L st-1 on the right side of equation 6. In such a case, one generally uses quasi-differences to remove individual effects (see HoltzEakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988) . This view presumes large N and small T. Here, N is fixed (and fairly small) while T is not (at least con-ceptually) fixed though it is small. Hence, consistency for either estimator resides on the notion that T can potentially increase without limit; neither the usual estimator or estimation after quasidifferencing dominates. We use the usual fixedeffects estimator. The terms RP st and Q st (and hence L st ) are simultaneously determined so we use instrumental variables (IV). We allow for stochastic γ st and ENFORCE st by including disturbances w st and v st , which implies that disturbances in equation 6 are the sum of a heteroscedastic disturbance, ε st , and a heteroscedastic MA (1) Breusch and Pagan (1979) and White (1980) (see also Godfrey, 1988) . We test both with and without the nonlinear restrictions among the coefficients in equation 6. Instruments are predicted values from regressions on the other variables in equation 6; lagged income and two-period lags of income and TAXDIF; the current, oneperiod, and two-period lagged state tax rate; the current, one-period, and two-period lagged wholesale price plus the federal excise tax rate; a dummy variable equal to 1 for years when the federal tax was $0.16 and 0 otherwise; and an index of grocery store wages as well as oneand two-period lags of the index. The four tests result in a rejection of (B2) (the largest p value is 0.0001). We test (B1) = 0) lies on the boundary of the parameter space, the LM statistic is still valid in large samples (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) . p values are 0.062 and 0.161. We estimate the model without the restriction σ 2 u = 0.
APPENDIX B. Data and Estimation
